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INTRODUCTION
In March 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court dealt a blow to the
biotechnology industry, issuing a decision that will render many methods of
medical diagnosis unpatentable. In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., the Court invalidated patents on a method to determine
the appropriate dosage level of the drug thiopurine, which is used to treat
autoimmune diseases.1 This method, in the Court’s view, did nothing more
than apply an unpatentable law of nature, the correlation between
thiopurine levels in the bloodstream and the drug’s efficacy, in a manner
that was well-understood by doctors.2 The Court reasoned that allowing
exclusive rights over this method would “inhibit future innovation premised
upon [it],” such as investigations into the underlying diseases or improved
methods of treating them.3 To support its analysis, the Court twice cited
Creation Without Restraint,4 the recent, pathbreaking book by Christina
Bohannan5 and Herbert Hovenkamp.6
As the Supreme Court’s recently heightened interest in patent law
illustrates,7 there is widespread belief that intellectual property (“IP”) law is
in crisis. Common critiques of patent law are that the Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”) grants too many patents, that these patents have poorly
defined boundaries, and that patent litigation is too expensive and
unpredictable. Patent law’s problems have inspired dozens of books,8
exponentially more scholarly articles, and even an episode of NPR’s This
American Life.9 Congress has also recognized that patent reform is needed,
passing the America Invents Act,10 which is intended to “improve patent

1. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012).
2. Id. at 1297–98.
3. Id. at 1301.
4. Id. at 1302, 1305.
5. Christina Bohannan, Professor and Lauridsen Family Fellow in Law, University of Iowa
College of Law.
6. Herbert Hovenkamp, Ben and Dorothy Willie Chair, University of Iowa College of
Law.
7. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court—
and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 792–93 (2010).
8. In addition to Creation Without Restraint, notable examples include: JAMES BESSEN &
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT
INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW (2009); ADAM B.
JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
9. When Patents Attack, NPR (July 26, 2011, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/
money/2011/07/26/138576167/when-patents-attack.
10. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 28 and 35 U.S.C.).
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quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”11 As
for copyright law, the primary concern is interest-group capture of the
legislative process by content owners (such as movie studios and record
companies) at the expense of users (consumers, educators, and other
artists), resulting in vast expansions of the rights and enforcement powers of
copyright holders.12
The core objective of Creation Without Restraint is to reorient IP law to its
constitutional purpose: promoting innovation.13 To do this, the authors
recommend, among other things, adopting an “IP injury” requirement in
infringement litigation. Similar to the better-known antitrust injury
requirement—which mandates that an antitrust plaintiff prove not just any
injury, but an injury to competition14—the IP injury requirement would
mandate that an infringement plaintiff prove an injury to the incentive to
innovate (p. 51).
An IP injury requirement is a commendable policy recommendation
and, just as important, is easy to justify under governing law. But there is
more to Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s argument. By reconceptualizing IP
law with an eye toward its constitutional roots, the authors make a
compelling case for related doctrinal reforms. They are not the first to
identify the need for less ambiguous patent claims,15 for restrictions on the
remedies available to patent holders who do not use the patented
technology,16 and for shorter but renewable copyright terms.17 The
fundamental contribution of Creation Without Restraint is that the authors’
expertise in both IP and antitrust yields novel, nuanced, and persuasive
justifications for these and other proposals. In particular, antitrust-inspired
proposals such as restricting the use of patents in networked markets and
expanding the role of IP misuse doctrine are buttressed by sophisticated
analyses showing how these changes to IP law can enhance competition,
which, in turn, should promote innovation.
This Review supplements the important contributions made by Creation
Without Restraint by exploring a complementary approach to reforming IP
law, and in particular patent law, that the book affords little attention. This
11.
12.

H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011).
See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 62–63 (2001). See generally ROBERT P.
MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 667–78 (5th ed. 2010) (summarizing recent copyright legislation).
13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .” (emphasis added)).
14. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
15. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 8, at 2–3.
16. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
17. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 251 (2001).
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approach focuses on the institutions that engage with patent law, such as the
courts and the PTO, and considers how institutional structure affects
substantive law.18 Accordingly, this Review considers how the institutional
design of the patent system might impede (or facilitate) adoption of the
reforms recommended in Creation Without Restraint. Approaching the
authors’ proposals from an institutional perspective can help determine
which government body is best positioned to resolve the current IP crisis in
the thoughtful ways suggested by their book.
This Review proceeds in two parts. Part I summarizes the book’s
descriptive insights and normative recommendations. It also describes how
IP law could easily incorporate the authors’ innovation-centered approach.
Indeed, many of their concerns are already reflected in recent Supreme
Court decisions in the field of patent law. Part I concludes by engaging the
IP injury proposal and questioning whether it will help courts resolve the
most vexing problems in modern patent law. For example, under the
authors’ approach, it is unclear whether the Supreme Court was correct in
Prometheus when it invalidated patents on methods of medical diagnosis,
even though the Court cited Creation Without Restraint to support its holding.
Part II broadens the perspective of Creation Without Restraint by looking
to the dynamic and growing literature on the institutional structure of the
patent system. The Review considers how the institutions that mold patent
law might limit the potential of the authors’ proposals. In particular, the
presence of a semi-specialized court for patent appeals, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, might impede the reformative capability of
the authors’ innovation-centered approach. However, other institutions,
such as the Office of the Solicitor General, play a critical role in shaping
patent law and may help bring Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s proposals into
effect.
I.

IP INJURY

This Part explains the authors’ fundamental arguments and, focusing
on the IP injury requirement in particular, suggests that their proposal is a

18. See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747 (2011);
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444 (2010); John M. Golden, The Supreme
Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 657 (2009); Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437
(2012); Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547 (2011); Jonathan
Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011); Joseph Scott Miller, Substance, Procedure, and
the Divided Patent Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 31 (2011); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy,
Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619 (2007); Arti K. Rai,
Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1035 (2003); Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 831 (2012); Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA.
L. REV. 501 (2010); Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure To Expand
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379 (2011).
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realistic solution that is actually reflected in some recent and important
Supreme Court decisions. It also explores the potential limitations of the IP
injury concept by using the example of patentable subject matter, perhaps
the most vexing issue in patent law today.
A. THE PROPOSAL
Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s recommendations are based largely on
the economic insights that “innovation contributes much more to economic
progress than the simple creation and maintenance of competitive markets”
and that the amount of economic competition is directly related to the
amount of innovation (pp. xi–xii). Accordingly, the core concern of both IP
and competition law should be, in the authors’ view, promoting innovation.
The authors define innovation broadly, as “human idea[s] that add[]
something important to what we already have” (p. ix). While Bohannan and
Hovenkamp approach their task in a thoughtful and evenhanded fashion,
they are clearly skeptical of the increasing propertization of ideas (see p.
xiv). As a general matter, their reforms would limit the rights of IP owners
and make it harder to obtain IP protection.
The starting point for their analysis is the IP injury requirement, which
would require infringement plaintiffs to prove injury to innovation
incentives. Bohannan and Hovenkamp have introduced this concept in a
prior article,19 and it provides a theoretical hook for more specific proposals
that follow. The IP injury requirement is inspired by antitrust law’s antitrust
injury requirement. As the authors explain, antitrust law once faced a
situation similar to today’s crisis in IP law. By the early 1970s, the Supreme
Court, largely at the behest of the executive branch, had condemned various
practices that would today be considered pro-competitive (or at least
competitively neutral), such as tying arrangements and mergers by firms
with no market power (pp. 35–37).20 In general, this approach shielded
businesses from price competition that would have benefitted consumers (p.
35). This focus on the protection of particular firms, rather than on
protection of competition generally, was heavily criticized by academic
commentators, both from the Chicago School and the more centrist
Harvard School (p. 38).
These critiques bore fruit in 1977, when the Supreme Court, in a
unanimous opinion by Justice Thurgood Marshall, imposed on private

19. See Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm,
51 B.C. L. REV. 905 (2010); see also Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair
Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 970 (2007) (developing the concept of “copyright harm,” which
would “limit[] infringement to foreseeable uses and other harmful uses that are likely to reduce
ex ante incentives to create or distribute copyrighted works”).
20. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Int’l Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28
(2006).
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antitrust plaintiffs a requirement that they demonstrate “antitrust injury”
before recovering damages.21 The defendant in that case, Brunswick, was a
leading supplier of bowling equipment, which it sold to alleys on credit.22
When the bowling industry went into decline in the 1960s, many alleys
defaulted on their equipment purchases.23 To collect on its debts, Brunswick
began acquiring and operating those defaulting alleys.24 The plaintiffs in
Brunswick operated bowling alleys in markets in which Brunswick had made
acquisitions.25 The antitrust violation alleged was that the plaintiffs had lost
profits because Brunswick prevented the defaulting alleys from closing.26
The Supreme Court rejected the antitrust claim. Justice Marshall’s
opinion emphasized—without any particular statutory or constitutional
support—that “[t]he antitrust laws . . . were enacted for ‘the protection of
competition, not competitors.’”27 To recover treble damages for antitrust
violations, the Court concluded that plaintiffs “must prove antitrust injury,
which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent.”28 In other words, antitrust plaintiffs now had to prove that their
claimed injury flowed from a loss of competition. Since the plaintiffs in
Brunswick were arguing that they had been harmed due to the maintenance of
competition (Brunswick’s acquisition and continued operation of the failing
alleys), the plaintiffs could not recover damages.
Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s IP injury proposal is similar to the
antitrust injury requirement. It would refocus IP law on its fundamental
purpose of promoting innovation, rather than protecting only individual
property rights. In the authors’ view, “IP law should recognize harm only for
[unauthorized] uses that are likely to interfere with IP holders’ decisions to
create or distribute their works” (p. 51). This IP injury requirement
measures incentives ex ante. So, an IP holder suffers IP injury when an
infringer’s actions diminish returns “that are reasonably foreseeable at the
time innovation occurs” (p. 56).
The IP injury requirement would change patent law in many ways. For
example, it suggests that patent law should be hesitant to allow infringement
suits based on claims that were added to a patent application after it was
submitted to the PTO, as it is unlikely (but not impossible) that those claims
21. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see also William
H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and
Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1269–78 (1989) (discussing how the Chicago School
influenced judicial adoption of the antitrust injury requirement).
22. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 479.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 479–80.
25. Id. at 480.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 488 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 320 (1962)).
28. Id. at 489 (emphasis omitted).
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provided an incentive to innovate in the first place (p. 53). Rather, an
applicant might have added those claims specifically to cover technology
that its competitors developed after the original application was filed (p.
73).
Like the antitrust injury requirement, the IP injury requirement might
be viewed as a prerequisite for an infringement claim. But Bohannan and
Hovenkamp also develop IP injury as a tool for constitutional and statutory
interpretation (p. xiv). As a constitutional example from copyright law,
consider Eldred v. Ashcroft29 and Golan v. Holder,30 cases in which the Supreme
Court upheld under the Constitution’s IP Clause statutes that extended the
duration of copyright protection on pre-existing works, including works that
had already entered the public domain. An approach to constitutional
interpretation focused on innovation incentives would have emphasized that
the term extensions could not possibly have provided ex ante incentives for
those works’ creation, and therefore did not “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,” as the Constitution requires.31
As for statutory interpretation, Bohannan and Hovenkamp see this
purposive approach as a tool to combat the interest-group capture that
permeates recent copyright legislation. For example, the authors urge that
“ambiguous statutes should be construed according to [any] stated publicinterest purpose” (p. 216). The legislative history of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”),32 for instance, purports to balance the rights of
copyright owners and users (pp. 217–18). Focusing on this supposed
purpose could mediate some of the law’s more draconian provisions. For
example, the DMCA prohibits the sale of devices that enable copying of
encrypted works, like commercial DVDs.33 This provision plainly prevents
some uses that would otherwise be permissible under copyright law’s fair use
doctrine, such as copying short movie clips for educational purposes.
(Imagine the Evidence professor who wishes to insert into his PowerPoint
slides the expert testimony of Mona Lisa Vito from My Cousin Vinny.) A court
applying the innovation-focused insights of IP injury could reason that the
public benefit of that educational use trumps the rights of the copyright
owner, who would likely suffer no lost sales due to use of the clip.
B. A DOCTRINALLY REALISTIC SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS IN IP LAW
Before considering possible critiques of Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s
proposal, it is important to note that the IP injury requirement is wellgrounded in existing law. In fact, it is much easier to justify the IP injury

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (2006).
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requirement under the patent and copyright laws than it is to justify the
antitrust injury requirement under the Sherman Act (pp. 50–51).
The Constitution explicitly states the purpose of the patent and
copyright laws: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”34 In
other words, to promote innovation. The Sherman Act, by contrast, says
nothing about its purpose. Section 1, for example, simply prohibits
“contract[s] . . . in restraint of trade.”35 Further, Congress passed the
Sherman Act under its constitutional power to “regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States,”36 which tells us little about the law’s intended
purpose. In fact, as Bohannan and Hovenkamp note, “[t]he history of the
Sherman Act suggests that Congress may not have favored ‘competition’ or
efficiency in the abstract, but rather the protection of small businesses that
were threatened by large, aggressive low-cost rivals” (p. 4). Nevertheless,
since it decided Brunswick in 1977, the Supreme Court has required private
antitrust plaintiffs to prove that their claimed injury stems from impaired
competition.
Not only does the Constitution provide a justification for an IP injury
requirement, the federal patent and copyright statutes are built for
purposive interpretation. Although recent legislation has added length and
complexity to both statutes (p. 44), relatively sparse provisions govern the
most important requirements of patentability: patentable subject matter,37
novelty,38 nonobviousness,39 and sufficient disclosure.40 And while copyright
statutes like the DMCA contain very detailed provisions, malleable concepts
like fair use provide courts with significant interpretative leeway.41 In these
critical respects, the IP laws are similar to the Sherman Act, with its openended prohibition on “restraint[s] of trade.”42 Sparse provisions give the
courts leeway to develop, in the common-law tradition, judicial rules
consistent with public policies underlying the relevant field of law.43

34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1. The statute’s broad prohibition further complicates the search for its
purpose because “restraint is the very essence of every contract,” so, as the Supreme Court has
noted, § 1 “cannot mean what it says.” Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 687–88 (1978) (emphasis added).
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
38. Id. § 102.
39. Id. § 103(a).
40. Id. § 112.
41. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (statutory fair-use provision); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447–48 (1984) (noting that § 107 “enable[s] a court
to apply an ‘equitable rule of reason’ analysis to particular claims of infringement”).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
43. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) (“The
statute books are full of laws, of which the Sherman Act is a good example, that effectively
authorize courts to create new lines of common law.”).
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Most encouraging for those who hope to see Bohannan and
Hovenkamp’s proposals adopted are some of the Supreme Court’s recent
patent law decisions, which reflect concern about innovation incentives.
Consider, for example, KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., which involved
Teleflex’s patent on an automobile pedal with an electronic sensor.44 When
sued for infringement, KSR argued that Teleflex’s patent was impermissibly
obvious under the Patent Act because it simply combined already-known
technology.45 On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied its “teaching,
suggestion, or motivation” (“TSM”) test and rejected KSR’s obviousness
argument.46 Under the TSM test, a patent could be proved obvious only if an
explicit “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” to combine the known
technology could be “found in the prior art” (such as issued patents and
existing publications), “the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a
person [with] ordinary skill in the art.”47
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rigid TSM
analysis.48 Instead, the Court emphasized a more holistic approach that
recognizes the importance of non-patent incentives—particularly market
incentives—as a spur to innovation. Rather than looking strictly at published
articles and issued patents, the Supreme Court instructed that an
obviousness analysis should also consider “the effects of demands known to
the design community or present in the marketplace,” among other factors,
“to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known
elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.”49 By attempting to
limit patent protection to pathbreaking advancements, KSR, in theory,
should reduce the expected costs of innovation by preventing infringement
claims based on nominal improvements, such as Teleflex’s combination of
an existing automobile pedal with a conventional electronic sensor.
In addition to KSR, other recent Supreme Court patent decisions reflect
concerns about whether the law is sufficiently protecting incentives to
innovate. For example, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court
rejected the Federal Circuit’s “general rule” that an adjudicated infringer
will be enjoined from selling its product.50 Instead, the Court held that the

44. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007).
45. Id. at 411–12; see 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“A patent may not be obtained . . . if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”).
46. KSR, 550 U.S. at 413–14.
47. Id. at 407.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 418.
50. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
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usual equitable test for injunctive relief should apply.51 As opposed to the
Federal Circuit’s presumption in favor of an injunction, this test allows lower
courts more room to consider whether the requested remedy might harm
the public’s interest in innovative (but infringing) products and services.52
Likewise, in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Court made it easier
for patent licensees to bring declaratory judgment suits challenging the
validity of the licensed patent.53 Specifically, the Court permitted licensees to
challenge patent validity even if they had not yet breached the license
agreement.54 This decision should encourage licensees to more actively
challenge patents of questionable validity and result in the invalidation of
more patents that would otherwise drag on innovation (p. 63).
Following the Supreme Court’s lead, lower courts have also begun to
more closely scrutinize the alleged harm underlying patent infringement
claims. One notable example is Judge Posner’s recent opinion in Apple, Inc.
v. Motorola, Inc.55 Sitting by designation on the district court, Judge Posner
dismissed both parties’ infringement claims because neither party could
prove entitlement to damages or an injunction.56 In reasoning that echoes
Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s approach, Judge Posner rejected Apple’s
argument for an injunction because it was “wild conjecture” that a company
as large as Apple would suffer “loss of market share, brand recognition, or
customer goodwill as a result of” patent infringement and because an
injunction might harm consumers who could no longer buy Motorola’s
products, even though they would prefer to do so.57
C. IP INJURY AND HARD CASES
In the areas where the insights of an innovation-centered approach
have started to take hold, the consequences of the legal rules seem relatively

51. Id. This test requires a plaintiff to prove (1) “that it has suffered an irreparable injury,”
(2) that money damages are inadequate, (3) that “the balance of hardships” favors an
injunction, and (4) that an injunction would not disserve the public interest. Id.
52. See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443–44 (E.D. Tex.
2006) (refusing an injunction that could have removed Microsoft Windows and Office from the
market, noting that “it is likely that any minor disruption to the distribution of the products in
question . . . would have an effect on the public due to the public’s undisputed and enormous
reliance on these products”).
53. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007).
54. Id.
55. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:11–cv–08540, 2012 WL 2376664 (N.D. Ill. June
22, 2012).
56. Id. at *22–23.
57. Id. at *18, *20. Considerations of harm were also central to the dismissal of the
damages claims. See id. at *6 (rejecting that a claim for nominal damages could save Apple’s suit
from dismissal because nominal damages are merely “a symbolic recognition of a wrong that
produced no harm”); id. at *7 (ruling that reasonable-royalty damages were not available
because such “compensatory damages” are not available when there has been “no tangible
injury”).
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clear. For example, eBay, by eliminating the presumption in favor of an
injunction, would seem to ensure that innovative products that lack
substitutes will remain available to the public, even if the products infringe.
While this rule would seem to provide the short-run benefit of protecting
consumer choice, longer term effects on innovation are not always easy to
definitively predict or measure, as Bohannan and Hovenkamp recognize (p.
254).58
Patentable subject matter under § 101 of the Patent Act is perhaps the
most contentious area of modern patent law and exemplifies the difficulty in
discerning innovation effects.59 The IP injury approach can no doubt
provide useful guidance in some § 101 cases. For example, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bilski v. Kappos60 can be understood through the lens of
IP injury. The specification of Bilski’s patent application described a method
of hedging price-fluctuation risk in energy markets, but the application’s
first claim recited a method of hedging “commodity” price-fluctuation risk.61
Bilski did not invent this broad principle. At most, he invented the idea of
applying known hedging principles to a particular field. Yet his patent would
have preempted use of these principles in any field. Under the IP injury
approach, Bilski could not have plausibly claimed that the foreseeable
returns from his “invention” would have included the use of known hedging
principles in all commodity markets.
But the innovation consequences of judicial decisions become more
complex outside the realm of abstract business-method patents. Take, for
example, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Prometheus, which
invalidated patents on a process that doctors could use to determine
whether drug dosage levels were too high or too low for effective
treatment.62 The patents (which had been licensed to Prometheus) claimed
a method of (1) administering thiopurine to a person with a gastrointestinal
disorder and (2) determining whether, based on observed levels of
thiopurine metabolites in the person’s bloodstream, the dose was too small
or too large for safe and effective treatment.63 The Court reasoned that the
patents simply applied an unpatentable law of nature, the correlation
58. Cf. F. Scott Kieff, Removing Property from Intellectual Property and (Intended?) Pernicious
Impacts on Innovation and Competition, 19 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 25, 41–43 (2011) (arguing that
eBay overly reduces the negotiating leverage of patent holders, impairing “the deals needed to
build small- and medium-sized business[es] that create new lines of business to compete against
existing ones”).
59. The requirement of patentable subject matter stems from the language of § 101 that
permits patents on “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof,” subject to the other requirements of the Patent Act.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
60. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
61. Id. at 3223–24.
62. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
63. Id. at 1295.
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between metabolite levels and the likelihood that a dosage of thiopurine will
be safe and effective.64 Although the claims instructed a particular audience
(doctors) about a practical application of that natural law (to treat
gastrointestinal disorders), that application was, in the Court’s view, a “wellunderstood, routine, conventional activity” that did not, as a doctrinal
matter, make the method patentable.65
As a normative matter, however, the question Creation Without Restraint
would pose in Prometheus is whether Mayo’s infringement diminishes returns
that the inventor would have expected in developing the patented
technology. On one hand, the patents in Prometheus, like the patent in Bilski,
were broad. They seemed to claim all observations of a natural
phenomenon, namely the biological correlation between thiopurine
metabolite levels and patient health. The patentee in Prometheus did not
invent this correlation, and the patents could hinder further improvements
upon the basic principles claimed, such as the new (and infringing) test that
Mayo had developed.66 On the other hand, personalized medicine is an
emerging field. Broad patents like Prometheus’s might be necessary to
incentivize initial commercialization efforts, and invalidating those patents
might deter further innovation.67
The Court in Prometheus actually acknowledged the question of
innovation incentives. The Court noted its “concern that patent law not
inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of
nature.”68 The Court even quoted Creation Without Restraint’s discussion of
problematic process claims, noting that “[t]hey risk being applied to a wide
range of situations that were not anticipated by the patentee.”69 However,
rather than passing judgment, the Court concluded that the mere
“presence” of “the basic underlying concern that these patents tie up too
much future use of laws of nature” reinforced its holding that the process
was not patentable.70
In discussing the views of those who participate in the market for
diagnostic testing (such as doctors, researchers, and sellers of diagnostic
tests), the Court noted that Prometheus and several amici argued that
invalidating patents like Prometheus’s would “interfere significantly with the
ability of medical researchers to make valuable discoveries.”71 However, the

64. See id. at 1296–97.
65. Id. at 1298.
66. See id. at 1296.
67. Cf. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265,
267–71 (1977) (developing the prospect theory of patents, under which the purpose of the
patent system is to induce commercialization of as-yet-unrealized ideas).
68. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1301.
69. Id. at 1302 (quoting p. 112) (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1304.
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Court also noted that several other amici contended that allowing patents
like Prometheus’s would result in “a vast thicket of exclusive rights over the
use of critical scientific data that must remain widely available if physicians
are to provide sound medical care.”72 The Court did not take sides in this
dispute over innovation effects. Rather, the Court noted only that it “need
not determine here whether, from a policy perspective, increased protection
for discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.”73
The Court’s agnosticism should not be surprising. At this point, it is just
not clear which approach provides stronger ex ante innovation incentives:
patent exclusivity or free use of diagnostic methods as building blocks for
further innovation. Moreover, the analysis of innovation incentives might
differ among different industries, meaning that IP injury concerns may need
to be articulated differently depending on the industry at issue.74 To their
credit, Bohannan and Hovenkamp acknowledge the difficulty of
constructing metrics and predictors of innovation (p. 242). As they
colorfully note, “IP law is based on a series of hunches about such things as
what types of markets and innovations require protection, or when we would
be better off to let more market-centered approaches . . . control” (p. 15).
None of this is to say that the IP injury requirement is flawed. But the
unclear consequences in cases like Prometheus highlight the need to further
refine the authors’ proposal to aid courts in solving vexing issues such as the
permissible scope of patentable subject matter.
II. IP INJURY AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
While patent courts might have difficulty measuring and predicting
innovation effects, the institutional structure of the patent system could also
present a barrier to adoption of the authors’ proposals for reform.
Bohannan and Hovenkamp cogently explain how the movement toward a
competition-protective antitrust regime took hold because of two related
developments. First, increasingly sophisticated economic analyses created a
consensus among scholars, judges, and policymakers that antitrust law
should be reoriented to focus on protecting competition (pp. 37–38). And
this consensus transferred into the case law because antitrust policy
remained mostly free from special interest influence (p. 44).75
These insights raise an important question for those seeking to refocus
patent law on promoting innovation: Does the institutional structure of the

72. Id. at 1304–05 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 1305.
74. Cf. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002) (arguing that “patent law is technology-neutral in theory” but
“technology-specific in application”).
75. But see D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1055, 1072–74 (2010) (discussing public-choice issues in the antitrust enforcement
process).
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patent system facilitate a judicial approach that explicitly focuses on
innovation consequences? Although this question is too complex to
definitively answer in this space, this Part provides an initial assessment of
how institutional dynamics might affect Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s
proposals. It first highlights the role that interest-group politics have played
in creating the structure of the patent system. Then it considers whether the
unique institution that arose from those politics, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, would adopt any of the reforms proposed. This Part
concludes by considering which institution, if not the nation’s expert patent
court, might best effect the changes called for in Creation Without Restraint.
A. INTEREST GROUPS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
As noted, the substance of the IP laws has been heavily influenced by
special interests. But special interests have also affected the structure of the
IP system, most notably in the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.76
Federal judges are mostly generalists; they usually do not specialize in
any one area of law.77 Legal scholars and policymakers have sometimes been
skeptical of courts, particularly appellate courts, with jurisdiction defined by
case subject matter rather than by geography. Various fears fuel this
skepticism. For example, judges of a so-called specialized court may be
subject to interest-group capture, the judges might lose sight of the social
values at stake in their decisions, the court might suffer from a lack of
prestige of its judicial positions, and the “expert” judges on the appellate
court might lack appropriate deference to trial judges.78
Despite this skepticism, U.S. patent law is shaped by the only Article III
court of appeals whose jurisdiction is defined by case subject matter and not
geography. Why does patent law get special treatment? The legislative
history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (“FCIA”),79 the law
that created the Federal Circuit, alludes to what Lawrence Baum has called
the “neutral virtues” of specialization: efficiency, quality, and uniformity.80
Committee reports on the Act suggest that the Federal Circuit was needed
because patent cases were consuming too much of the regional circuits’

76. For a more detailed discussion of the role of interest groups in the Federal Circuit’s
creation, see Gugliuzza, supra note 18, at 1445–61.
77. See Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, Speech Delivered at the Southern Methodist
University School of Law (Feb. 11, 1997), in 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1755–56 (1997). But see
Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 526 (2008) (showing
that judges on the federal circuit courts of appeals often “specialize” by writing many opinions
in specific subject areas).
78. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 168 (1976).
79. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
80. LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 32 (2011).
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time, inexperienced generalist judges were rendering poor quality decisions,
and patent law varied greatly among the circuits.81
The possibility of appellate centralization in patent law had been
explored frequently in the twentieth century, particularly in the 1960s and
1970s as the caseloads of the federal appellate courts exploded.82 For
example, in 1975, a notable congressional commission emphasized that
forum shopping had become a “widespread” problem in patent cases due to
the perception that some circuits were hostile to patent rights while others
were not.83 The commission’s patent law consultants blamed this problem
on the lack of an appellate institution to issue “nationally binding decisions”
on patent law.84 Indeed, long before the caseload exploded, distinguished
jurists such as Felix Frankfurter, Learned Hand, and Henry Friendly
expressed skepticism about the ability of generalist judges to understand
patent disputes.85 Yet none of these voices spurred institutional change.
Why then did the Federal Circuit proposal gain traction? One reason
may lie in the strong corporate support for the Federal Circuit.86 By the late
1970s, business interests seem to have taken the view that greater certainty
in patent litigation would simplify business planning and stimulate research
and development.87 Perhaps as important was that a centralized patent
court, especially one formed from the patent-friendly Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (“CCPA”), would be likely to uphold patents against validity
challenges.88 The corresponding increase in the value of patent rights would
benefit patent owners, particularly large corporations with extensive
portfolios, and their patent lawyers. This explanation of the Federal Circuit’s
creation is consistent with Professor Baum’s argument that the most

81. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22–23 (1981).
82. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 72–73 tbl.3.6
(1996) (showing courts of appeals’ caseload growth).
83. COMM’N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 220 (1975).
84. Id.
85. See Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60–61 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (Hand,
J.); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 157 (1973).
86. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22 (citing a poll conducted by the Industrial
Research Institute, “a private, non-profit corporation with a membership of approximately 250
industrial companies that account for a major portion of the industrial research and
development conducted in the United States,” which “overwhelmingly” favored the creation of
the Federal Circuit); 127 CONG. REC. 27,793–94 (1981) (listing corporate supporters of the
FCIA, including Dow Chemical, Eli Lilly, Exxon, General Motors, Goodyear, IBM, Johnson &
Johnson, Merck, Monsanto, 3M, Phillips Petroleum, Polaroid, Procter & Gamble, Shell Oil,
Standard Oil, and Xerox).
87. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (1981) (noting the testimony of the general patent counsel
of General Electric, Harry F. Manbeck, Jr.).
88. See Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral Reforms or Efforts To Shape
Judicial Policy?, 74 JUDICATURE 217, 223 (1991).
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powerful driver for forming a specialized court is interest-group desire to
influence the substance of judicial policy, and not the “neutral virtues” that
permeate the political debate.89 It is also consistent with broader publicchoice literature suggesting that legislative reform can often be understood
as self-interested behavior by a small, well-organized group, as corporate
patent owners and their lawyers seemed to have been in the lead-up to the
FCIA.90
To be sure, the support of large businesses and their lawyers was not the
sole stimulus for the Federal Circuit’s creation. The U.S. Department of
Justice played a crucial role in rallying congressional support.91 The Federal
Circuit’s creation may have also depended on the approval of the judges of
the two courts that were being abolished, the CCPA and the Court of Claims,
as well as the Judicial Conference of the United States.92 And the support of
eminent scholars and notable federal judges was surely influential.93
Even so, those most closely associated with the Federal Circuit’s creation
acknowledged the importance of industry support. Daniel Meador, for
example, noted that his staff at the Department of Justice “had organized
the corporate patent counsel into an effective support group for the Federal
Circuit.”94 At the final judicial conference of the CCPA, Chief Judge Howard
Markey recognized representatives from Monsanto, DuPont, FMC
Corporation, and Combustion Engineering Corporation as “contribut[ing]
so much to what will be the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”95
Perhaps most telling is the title of a monograph published in 1982 by the
National Chamber Foundation, a policy research group affiliated with the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce: The Court American Business Wanted and Got: The
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.96
In Creation Without Restraint, Bohannan and Hovenkamp thoroughly
explore how the substance of IP law (unlike antitrust law) has been deeply
affected by interest-group politics (see, e.g., ch. 6). The potential interest-

89.
90.

Id. at 217–19; accord JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 8, at 10.
See MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 50 (2009). But see Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible
Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 399 (raising questions about “public choice theoretical
predictions about the formation of the Federal Circuit”).
91. See generally Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the Federal Circuit: A Personal Account, 41 AM. U.
L. REV. 581 (1992).
92. See Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More than a National
Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 63 (1984).
93. See 127 CONG. REC. 27,793 (1981).
94. Meador, supra note 91, at 610.
95. Hon. Howard T. Markey, Chief Judge, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
Introductory Remarks at the Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the U.S. Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, in 94 F.R.D. 350, 350 (1982).
96. FRANK P. CIHLAR, THE COURT AMERICAN BUSINESS WANTED AND GOT: THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT (1982).

B1_GUGLIUZZA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

12/29/2012 1:42 PM

IP INJURY AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF PATENT LAW

763

group influence in creating the structure of the patent system raises
concerns about whether that structure affects the feasibility of the authors’
reform proposals.
B. IP INJURY IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT?
As those urging the creation of the Federal Circuit may have hoped, the
court has been relatively protective of the validity of patents.97 The result of
adopting many of Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s proposals, however, would
be fewer patents being issued and a weakened bundle of accompanying
rights. Thus, there are questions about whether the Federal Circuit, if given
the opportunity to do so, would consider pushing patent law in the direction
suggested by Bohannan and Hovenkamp.
Even if the Federal Circuit were willing to pursue the normative aim of
weakening patent rights and reducing the number and scope of patents, it is
questionable whether the court would deploy the specific recommendation
of an IP injury requirement in patent infringement cases. As noted, an IP
injury analysis would require courts deciding infringement cases to consider
the constitutional purpose of the patent laws: promoting incentives for
innovation. Yet Federal Circuit judges have been peculiarly resistant to
adopting a purposive approach to patent adjudication. Many of the court’s
judges have publicly contended that patent policy is irrelevant to their
work.98
In an era in which federal judges must, as a seeming requirement of
confirmation, claim to simply “call balls and strikes,” one cannot necessarily
fault these judges for contending that their decisions merely apply the letter

97. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 336–37 (2003); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical
Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 251 (1998); see also Matthew D.
Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s Impact on Patent Litigation, 35
J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 90, 114 (2006) (noting that since the Federal Circuit was created, court
decisions invalidating patents have significantly decreased, but the number of decisions finding
infringement has stayed the same or decreased); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Federal
Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2–3 (2003) (noting
that the Federal Circuit has been relatively protective of patent validity, but has also narrowed
the scope of infringement).
98. See, e.g., Paul Michel, Judicial Constellations: Guiding Principles as Navigational Aids, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 764–65 (2004) (rejecting the notion that the court should have a
“discussion of philosophy”); S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law’s
Uniformity Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1735, 1737–38 (2007)
(arguing that “the [Federal Circuit’s] function is not . . . to determine how well-tuned the
[patent] statute is to . . . market conditions”); Alan D. Lourie, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fed. Circuit, A View from the Court, Address at the Fifth Annual Seton Hall Law and New
Jersey Intellectual Property Law Association Fall Lecture Series (Oct. 23, 2007), in 75 PAT.,
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 22, 24 (2007) (“[N]ot once have we had a discussion as to
what direction the law should take . . . . That is because we are not a policy-making body. We
have just applied precedent as best we could determine it to the cases that have come before
us.”).
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of the law. But the Federal Circuit’s lack of concern for the consequences of
decisions can be extreme.99 Moreover, those who call for more attention to
patent policy are not asking the court to subvert the text of the Patent Act to
the judges’ personal preferences. Rather, they want the court to appreciate
the discretion built into the statute, just as courts have recognized the
discretion built into the antitrust statutes, and to use that discretion to allow
patent law to be flexibly applied to the varied needs of different innovating
industries.100
Another relevant concern in analyzing whether the Federal Circuit
would adopt Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s proposals stems from not
knowing what exactly motivates the decisions of federal appellate judges,
who have the security of life tenure and a salary that cannot be reduced, in
cases where the law provides no clear directive. The answer to this question
is particularly mysterious in the Federal Circuit, where difficult cases do not
necessarily have clear political consequences and the judges have practically
no hope of the one promotion available to other judges—elevation to the
Supreme Court.101
Judge Posner has suggested that one important motivator for lifetenured judges is prestige.102 A desire for prestige might be uniquely
important to Federal Circuit judges, who toil on a court that remains a
mystery to many practicing lawyers and might still be considered something
of an experiment.103 To the extent Federal Circuit judges are interested in
self-preservation, it might be in their interest to, if at all possible, enhance

99. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Congress did not intend
for . . . practical implications to affect the determination of whether an invention satisfies the
requirements [of the Patent Act]. They are public policy considerations which are more
appropriately directed to Congress as the legislative branch of government, rather than this
court as a judicial body responsible simply for interpreting and applying statutory law.”).
100. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1674 (2003). For examples of recent decisions embracing the discretion available under the
antitrust statutes, see Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881–82
(2007) (overruling Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), which
held that it was per se illegal for a manufacturer to set the minimum price a distributor can
charge for the manufacturer’s goods), and Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547
U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (rejecting the presumption that a patent on a tying product establishes the
market power necessary to support an antitrust claim, abrogating older case law on the issue).
101. No Federal Circuit judge has ever been elevated to the Supreme Court, nor, to my
knowledge, has any Federal Circuit judge been seriously considered for appointment.
102. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else
Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 13 (1993) (noting that “prestige is unquestionably an element of
the judicial utility function”); see also LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION
FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 20–24 (2005) (arguing that
bankruptcy judges compete for the bankruptcy cases of large public companies because of,
among other things, the power and celebrity that accompany the cases).
103. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in
Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (2004); John F. Duffy, Comment, Experiments After the
Federal Circuit, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 803 (2004).
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the prominence and economic importance of the patent system. At the risk
of overgeneralizing, one might surmise that a large number of patents with a
strong bundle of corresponding rights would make patent law important to
business planning, elevate the importance of the Federal Circuit and its
decisions, and cement the court as a permanent institution.104
So, while Bohannan and Hovenkamp direct most of their proposals at
the courts (p. 395), their primary target for patent law reform, the Federal
Circuit, may not want to hear the message. For an innovation-centered
approach to take hold, there must be an institutional audience that has
incentives to seek change. If that institution is not the Federal Circuit, is
there another body that might take the lead?
C. THE AUDIENCE FOR CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT
The executive branch significantly impacts judicially created antitrust
law through the enforcement powers and amicus work of the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice. The economics-based approach
of those agencies has taken hold in the Supreme Court, which has
consistently overruled pre-1970s antitrust decisions over the past thirty years
(pp. 38–39).105 In comparison, the agency that administers the Patent Act,
the PTO, lacks institutional strength. It has no authority to interpret the
statutory requirements for patentability, and its actions do not receive the
deference commonly afforded to other administrative agencies.106 Although
the PTO frequently litigates in the Federal Circuit, often defending its
decisions in appeals from patent denials, the limited available data suggests
that the PTO is no more successful than the average litigant.107 In short, the
104. One might also think that the court’s increasing importance and permanence would
make the court more attractive to potential appointees and more important to the President
and senators involved in the confirmation process. The court is no doubt staffed with jurists
who are quite capable. All of President Obama’s nominees to the court, for example, have been
rated as “well qualified” by the American Bar Association. See Ratings for Judicial Nominees, AM.
BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/federal_judiciary/resources/
ratings_for_judicial_nominees.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). The obstacles discussed in this
Review are not, in my view, related to intellectual or temperamental shortcomings of the
individual judges on the court. Rather, they seem to stem from institutional pathologies unique
to specialized courts. See Nard & Duffy, supra note 18, at 1622 (“[P]ersistent problems in
institutions . . . are unlikely to be the fault of the individuals who serve the institution. . . . The
fault is much more likely to be structural . . . .”). For a more detailed exploration of judicial
incentives on specialized courts, see Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
105. The enforcement practices of the antitrust agencies have also changed during this
period. See, e.g., Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics, and Enforcement, 7 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 733, 76771 (2011) (documenting the shift in enforcement practices
by the Department of Justice away from civil actions and toward criminal cases).
106. See Tran, supra note 18, at 833–34.
107. According to statistics maintained by the Federal Circuit, the reversal rate for appeals
from U.S. district courts over the past three years has been 14.7%. See Statistics, U.S. CT. APPEALS
FOR FED. CIRCUIT, http://cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/statistics.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2012)
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PTO is unlikely to successfully advance the proposals recommended by
Bohannan and Hovenkamp.
As discussed, the antitrust revolution began in academic literature and
later migrated into the antitrust agencies and the courts. Creation Without
Restraint is emblematic of the call for patent reform in the academic
literature. Although the PTO may be unable to implement the authors’
proposals, and the Federal Circuit may be unwilling to do so, there are other
potential institutional audiences. For example, recent Supreme Court patent
cases have overruled bright-line Federal Circuit rules in favor of standards
that, in theory, could flexibly account for competition and innovation
concerns in different industries.108 And some of the Justices’ patent opinions
cite important academic work, such as Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s.109 But
as Lee Petherbridge and David Schwartz have recently shown, the
percentage of Supreme Court patent opinions citing legal scholarship
(28.3%) is slightly lower than the overall percentage of cases citing legal
scholarship (32.2%).110 Interestingly, however, the Court cites scholarship in
an astounding 66.7% of its copyright cases, again illustrating potential
openness to ideas posed in IP literature.111
Of course, the Court’s failure to consistently cite patent scholarship
does not mean the Court is unaware of that literature. In all events, the best
way to keep the Court abreast of the problems and potential solutions
discussed by this literature is through the briefs in its IP cases. The best
audience for the thoughtful proposals in Creation Without Restraint might
therefore be the Office of the Solicitor General. As John Duffy has shown,
the Solicitor General has had enormous influence over the Supreme Court’s
patent decisions throughout the last decade, with the Supreme Court
adopting the Solicitor General’s views on the merits in all nine cases from
the 1996 Term through the 2007 Term in which the Solicitor General
challenged the Federal Circuit’s reasoning.112
As shown in the Appendix, however, the Solicitor General has not
enjoyed the same success in the past three Terms, losing two of the three
cases in which the Solicitor General and the Federal Circuit clearly
(click on annual data for “Appeals Filed, Terminated, and Pending”). For appeals from the
PTO, the reversal rate has been 16.3%. Id.
108. See Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1109, 1126–34 (2010).
109. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302,
1305 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3253–54 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring); Lab.
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 139 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
110. Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, The End of an Epithet?, 49 HOUS. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 18–19) (on file with author).
111. Id.
112. John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 518, 540–44 (2010).
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disagreed. And in Prometheus, the Solicitor General unsuccessfully defended
the Federal Circuit’s holding that the patent recited patentable subject
matter.113 Still, it is fair to say that, in cases involving core issues of patent
law, the Supreme Court has usually adopted the positions advanced by the
Solicitor General. In the past decade, the Court has adopted the Solicitor
General’s position on issues of patentability,114 infringement,115 remedies,116
and standards of proof,117 among others.
Of course, as Arti Rai notes, the Solicitor General has no special
expertise in patent law; it “is a generalist actor that refines and arbitrates
among the views of underlying agencies that have more specialized expertise
in the legal questions at issue.”118 It is this position as a mediator that makes
the Solicitor General particularly well-positioned to incorporate the insights
of Creation Without Restraint. As the Solicitor General is formulating the
position of the United States on patent law matters, it will consult not just
with the PTO, but also antitrust lawyers and economists from the
Department of Justice, as well as Civil Division lawyers, who defend the
United States itself in infringement litigation. These discussions might also
involve officials from the Federal Trade Commission and other interested
agencies.119 These specialists are well-versed in the competition- and
innovation-oriented perspectives that Bohannan and Hovenkamp emphasize
and are in a position to incorporate those views into the position of the
United States, as articulated by the Solicitor General.
Moreover, in patent cases, the Solicitor General’s influence is important
not only on the merits, but also in shaping the Court’s agenda. As Professor
Duffy explains, from the 1994 Term through the 2007 Term, the Supreme
Court followed the Solicitor General’s recommendation to either grant or
deny certiorari in seventeen of the nineteen patent cases (89.5%) in which

113. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 8–11,
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150),
2011 WL 4040414 (arguing that the patent claims recited patentable subject matter but were
likely invalid for obviousness or lack of novelty).
114. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
115. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
116. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
117. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
118. Arti K. Rai, Essay, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for Policy
Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1240 (2012).
119. See generally Elliott Karr, Independent Litigation Authority and Calls for the Views of the
Solicitor General, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1080, 1087–88 (2009) (noting that “the Solicitor
General must resolve competing claims made by different agencies of the government when
deciding what position to take before the Supreme Court” and that “the Solicitor General is
usually capable of being a neutral arbiter of opposing agencies’ views,” but questioning whether
the Solicitor General prefers the views of the Department of Justice over the Federal Trade
Commission); Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1077 (2001)
(describing the process by which the Solicitor General obtains and evaluates the perspectives of
various government bodies).
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the Court called for the Solicitor General’s views.120 As shown in the
Appendix, this trend has continued in the past five Terms, with the Court
following the Solicitor General’s recommendation in four out of five patent
cases in which it has sought the Solicitor General’s views.
The Solicitor General’s particularly heavy influence in patent cases is
clear not just from these numbers, but also from the substance of the issues
the Court has considered, often at the Solicitor General’s urging. As noted,
the Court in recent years has been willing to engage fundamental issues of
patent law, such as patentable subject matter, nonobviousness, and
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents,121 as well as crucial
procedural issues in patent litigation, such as declaratory-judgment
standing,122 the standard of proof for infringement,123 and remedies for
patent holders.124 Similar future cases might permit the Solicitor General to
argue, in line with the authors’ proposed IP injury requirement, that harm
to innovation incentives is a definitional aspect of an infringement claim.
For example, in an appropriate case, the Solicitor General might urge the
Court to adopt Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s proposal to limit damages for
infringement when the patent holder is unlikely to enter a market (p. 56).
Such a holding would dramatically change the patent litigation system by
limiting the damages recoverable by non-practicing entities. The Office of
the Solicitor General may be the only entity with sufficient credibility to
advance such a pathbreaking approach.
CONCLUSION
To be clear, the potential institutional barriers to reimagining patent
law do not undermine the basic thesis of Creation Without Restraint: that there
needs to be a closer nexus between IP law and its constitutional purpose.
Although IP owners have had a louder voice in Congress than consumers of
innovation (pp. 133–60), the consensus around stronger IP rights seems to

120. See Duffy, supra note 112, at 531. By comparison, from the 1998 Term through the
2004 Term, the Court followed the Solicitor General’s recommendation in roughly 78.5% of
all cases in which the Court called for the Solicitor General’s views. See David C. Thompson &
Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call
for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 276
(2009) (noting that the Court followed the Solicitor General’s recommendation to grant in
eighteen of twenty-four cases (75.0%) and followed the recommendation to deny in forty-four
of fifty-five cases (80.0%)); see also Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The
Solicitor General’s Changing Role in Supreme Court Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1323, 1334 & n.51
(2010) (citing additional sources calculating the rate at which the Court follows the Solicitor
General’s recommendation on certiorari and noting that “the Court follows the Solicitor
General’s recommendation to grant or deny in well over 75% of the cases”).
121. See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text.
122. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
123. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
124. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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be weakening. For example, while the recently passed America Invents Act125
will likely not solve all of patent law’s problems,126 it increases the rights of
third parties to challenge patents at the PTO,127 an important aspect of
Bohannan and Hovenkamp’s roadmap for reform (p. 397). Also, the
widespread opposition to the Stop Online Piracy Act128 and the PROTECT
IP Act,129 better known by the acronyms SOPA and PIPA, resulted in a
surprising legislative defeat for IP owners.130
This Review has highlighted possible institutional obstacles to IP law
reform, hoping to advance a conversation about how the authors’
thoughtful agenda might be further operationalized. Identifying institutions,
like the Office of the Solicitor General, that are well-positioned to shape IP
law in the way that Bohannan and Hovenkamp imagine may both resolve the
IP crisis and return IP law to its constitutional roots of protecting and
promoting innovation.

125. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 28 and 35 U.S.C.).
126. See Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 595, 596 (2012) (noting that
“leaders in the patent community have divided in their opinions about the Act”).
127. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 6(d) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329).
128. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
129. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual
Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
130. Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy Bills, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/technology/senate-postpones-piracyvote.html.
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APPENDIX

SUPREME COURT PATENT CASES, OCTOBER TERMS 2008 THROUGH 2011131

Term

SG
Participates
on Merits

SG –
CAFC
Split

Position
Adopted

CVSG

Bilski v.
Kappos132

2009

Party

No

S. Ct.
agrees with
both

N/A
(Respondent)

Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc.
v. SEB S.A.133

2010

No

Bd. of Trs. of
the Leland
Stanford Junior
Univ. v. Roche
Molecular Sys.,
Inc.134

2010

Yes

Yes

CAFC

Yes

Microsoft Corp.
v. i4i Ltd.
P’ship135

2010

Yes

No

S. Ct.
agrees with
both

No

Mayo
Collaborative
Servs. v.
Prometheus
Labs., Inc.136

2011

Yes

No

Neither

No

Caraco Pharm.
Labs., Ltd. v.
Novo Nordisk
A/S137

2011

Yes

Yes

SG

Yes

Kappos v.
Hyatt138

2011

Party

Yes

CAFC

N/A
(Petitioner)

Case Name

SG:
CAFC:
CVSG:

No

Solicitor General
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Call for the Views of the Solicitor General

131. This chart is a continuation of Figure 8 from Duffy, supra note 112, at 539.
132. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
133. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
134. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2188 (2011).
135. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
136. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
137. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012).
138. Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012).

B1_GUGLIUZZA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

12/29/2012 1:42 PM

IP INJURY AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF PATENT LAW

771

PATENT CASES INVOLVING SUPREME COURT CVSG ORDERS,
OCTOBER TERMS 2008 THROUGH 2011139

Case Name

Term
Order
Issued

Lower
Court

SG Cert.
Rec.

Cert.?

SG
Merits
Rec.

Merits
Disposition

Bd. of Trs. of
the Leland
Stanford Junior
Univ. v. Roche
Molecular Sys.,
Inc.140

2009

CAFC

Grant

Granted

Reverse

Affirmed

2010

CAFC

Deny

Denied

2010

CAFC

Grant

Granted

Vacate
and
remand

Reversed
and
remanded

2011

CAFC

Deny

Denied

2011

CAFC

Deny

Granted

Applera Corp.
v. Enzo
Biochem,
Inc.141
Caraco Pharm.
Labs., Ltd. v.
Novo Nordisk
A/S142
Saint-Gobain
Ceramics &
Plastics, Inc. v.
Siemens Med.
Solutions USA,
Inc.143
Bowman v.
Monsanto
Co.144
SG:
Rec.:
CAFC:

Solicitor General
Recommendation
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

139. This chart is a continuation of Figure 5 from Duffy, id. at 531. While Professor Duffy’s
original chart included patent-related antitrust cases, the Court did not call for the views of the
Solicitor General in any patent-related antitrust cases from 2008 through 2011. See Briefs, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/index.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
140. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 2188 (2011).
141. Applera Corp. v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 3020 (2011).
142. Caraco, 132 S. Ct. 1670.
143. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Solutions USA, Inc., 132 S. Ct.
2679 (2012).
144. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., No. 11-796, 2012 WL 4748082 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2012).

